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Overlooked in the Tort
Reform Debate: The Growth
of Erroneous Removal
Theodore Eisenberg and Trevor W. Morrison*
Disputes over forum often center on whether a case should proceed in state
or federal court. Removal to federal court can trigger a costly forum struggle. When a state case is removed to federal court only to be sent back to
state court, the time and resources incurred in the detour are a toll on the
judicial system and waste parties’ resources. We find erroneous removal to
be an increasing problem. From 1993 to 2002, a period when state tort
filings noticeably decreased, the number of removed diversity tort cases
increased by about 10 percent to about 8,900 per year. By 2003, removed
cases comprised over 30 percent of the federal diversity docket. The percentage of removals ultimately remanded to state court increased significantly to about 20 percent in 2003, with the remand rate exceeding 50
percent in some districts. Thus, as more cases purporting to satisfy diversity
jurisdiction were being removed to federal court, and just as removals were
occupying an increasing part of the federal docket, removed cases were
being remanded to state court at increasing rates. Erroneous removal is a
growing phenomenon that should be addressed as part of serious consideration of tort reform.

*Address correspondence to Theodore Eisenberg, Cornell Law School, Myron Taylor Hall,
Ithaca, NY 14853; email: theodore-eisenberg@postoffice.law.cornell.edu. Theodore Eisenberg
is Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Trevor Morrison is Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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comments and criticisms. We also thank Kevin Clermont and Jeffrey Rachlinski for their helpful
comments.
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I. Introduction
Disputes over forum are a staple of civil litigation, often centering on
whether the case should proceed in state or federal court.1 The pattern is
familiar: plaintiff sues in state court; defendant removes to federal court,
contending the case meets the requirements of federal jurisdiction; plaintiff
counters by seeking a remand to state court, arguing removal was improper.
These skirmishes matter. First, a party tends to fare better when the case is
litigated in its chosen forum. Thus, when a defendant removes a state case
to federal court, it obtains an advantage.2 Even if the case is never fully tried,
the terms of the settlement will likely reflect the results of the forum contest.3
Second, removal disputes can be expensive, in terms of both time and
money. Litigating a removal may run up attorney fees and other costs, thus
sapping the poorer party’s litigation resources and harming its bargaining
position. In short, removal can have powerful effects.4

1
See J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 Wayne
L. Rev. 317, 333 (1967) (“forum-shopping, among both federal and state courts, is a national
legal pastime”).
2
“Statistical analysis indicates a removal effect for diversity cases in the neighborhood of a
reduction from even (or 50%) odds for plaintiffs to about 35%. A further regression controlling for the case-selection theory of locale aversion, however, raises plaintiffs’ odds to 39%.”
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything about
the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 581, 606–07 (1998).
Stated otherwise, “plaintiffs’ loss of forum advantage . . . reduces their chance of winning by
about one-fifth.” Id. at 607 n.81; see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation
Realities, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 119, 123 (2002) (“forum really does affect outcome, with removal
taking the defendant to a much more favorable forum”).
3
See Clermont & Eisenberg, Win Rates, supra note 2, at 599 (“After removal . . . the parties
will settle or litigate subject to the real or perceived differences of the federal forum.”).
4
These effects have long been evident. For example, in the first decades of the 20th century,
when the federal courts were widely viewed as hostile to suits by relatively poor individuals
against large corporate entities, defendants “cherished and valued” their right of removal and
exercised it regularly. Armistead M. Dobie, Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure
364 (1928); see C.P. Connolly, Big Business and the Bench: The Federal Courts—Last Refuge
of the “Interests,” 26 Everybody’s Mag. 827 (1912); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of
Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and Social Change Reshape the Law, in Civil Procedure Stories 22, 27 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004) (quoting a federal judge as remarking in
1930 that “‘nearly all of the personal injury cases were removed to the federal court on account
of diversity of citizenship by the mining, smelting, railroad, and other large corporations doing
business’ in the state”) (quoting William H. Sawtelle to George W. Norris, June 7, 1930, George
W. Norris Papers (Library of Congress), “Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 1929–30, file,”
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This power may give reason to be especially concerned about the risk
of erroneous removal. The removal process enables a defendant to remove
a state case to federal court automatically, without any initial adjudication of
whether the requirements for removal are met.5 Erroneous removals can be
cured only after the fact, when the plaintiff seeks a remand or the federal
court orders it sua sponte. Even then, a remand order does not fully cure
the error, as by itself it cannot recapture the time and resources lost in the
process.6 Given this, there is reason to worry not only about the possibility
of good-faith mistakes in the removal process, but knowing abuse as well. A
defendant hoping to squeeze resources from its less-well-financed opponent
might remove a case, even though it knows the requirements for removal
are not met, simply to impose on the plaintiff the costs of litigating the
remand.7
Erroneous removal is costly for the courts as well as the parties. When
a state case is removed to federal court only to be sent back to state court,
the time and resources incurred in the detour are a toll on the judicial
system. Federal court resources are expended on a case that should not have
been there, and the parties ultimately return to state court having made no
progress toward resolving the merits of their case. This is “essentially a waste
of time and resources,” for the courts as well as the parties.8

Tray 78, Box. 8); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction
in Industrial America, 1870–1958, at 20–22 (1992) (providing data to confirm the prevalence
of removal by corporate defendants in the late 1920s and early 1930s).
5

See text accompanying notes 32–37 for a discussion of the mechanics of removal and remand.

6

We discuss the availability of fee-shifting below. See notes 63–65 and accompanying text.

7
Such maneuvering is nothing new. As Edward Purcell has explained, in the early 20th century,
out-of-state corporate defendants sued in state court by in-state plaintiffs exercised their right
to remove in part because of the tactical advantage it conferred:

Because federal suits were more inconvenient and expensive, and because those burdens
weighed much more heavily on parties with few resources, removal often placed heavy and
disproportionate pressures on relatively poor individual plaintiffs. Consequently, corporations were often able to use removal to exploit those practical burdens and thereby induce
individual plaintiffs to abandon their claims or settle them for minimal amounts.
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power, and
the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America 66 (2000).
8
Navarro Savings Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 464 n.1 (1980) (quoting David P. Currie, The
Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Part I, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1968)); see
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 549 (1995) (Thomas,
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Despite these costs, the public debate over “tort reform” largely ignores
the issue of erroneous removal. Instead, the debate typically focuses on perceived abuses by the plaintiffs’ bar.9 Consider, for example, the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005.10 Designed principally to counter the attempts of plaintiffs’ counsel to structure state class-action lawsuits so as to keep them in state
court,11 the statute creates a number of new grounds for removing such suits
to federal court.12 The law does not, however, address the problem of erroneous—even knowingly erroneous—removal. This is not because the
drafters of the law were unaware of the problem. To the contrary, the Senate
Committee Report on the bill openly notes the existence of erroneous
removal.
Under the current standards [prior to the enactment of the new statute], many
(and possibly most) newly-filed state court class actions are removed to federal
court to test whether the class counsel’s efforts to evade federal jurisdiction have
been successful (even though those removal attempts normally fail and the cases are
remanded to state court). Those inquiries are often quite complicated and can
create significant delays.13
J., concurring in the judgment) (advocating the adoption of “clear, bright-line [jurisdictional]
rule[s]” so that “judges and litigants will not waste their resources in determining the extent of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction”).
9
See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors & Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action “Cops”:
Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs? 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1441, 1444–51 (2005) (claiming that
“[t]here is growing public distrust of the class action device,” and focusing on the actions of
plaintiffs’ counsel).
10

Pub. L. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).

11

Id. at § 2(a)(4), 119 Stat. 5 (finding that “[a]buses in class actions undermine the national
judicial system, the free flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction
. . . , in that State and local courts are . . . keeping cases of national importance out of Federal
court,” and stating that one of the purposes of the Class Action Fairness Act is to “provid[e]
for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction”); S. Rep. No. 109–14, at 68 (2005) (stating that “current law enables lawyers to ‘game’
the procedural rules and keep nationwide or multi-state class actions in state courts,” and
further stating that the Class Action Fairness Act “makes it harder for plaintiffs’ counsel to ‘game
the system’ by trying to defeat diversity jurisdiction” and “places the determination of more
interstate class action lawsuits in the proper forum—the federal courts”).

12

See, e.g., id. at § 4(a) (expanding federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds $5 million) and § 5(a) (providing for removal of class actions
meeting the new jurisdictional requirements).

13

S. Rep. No. 109–14, at 68 (2005) (emphasis added).
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Despite this rather striking acknowledgment, however, the statute does
nothing to address the problem head on, and instead simply expands the
grounds of permissible removal. Yet even as the legislation creates new
grounds for removal, it presents new ways for removal to happen in error.14
At some point, therefore, the issue of erroneous removal may demand more
direct treatment.
One reason for the lack of such treatment to date may be the absence
of any clear sense of the extent of the problem.15 Although the supporters
of the Class Action Fairness Act acknowledged the general prevalence of

14

For example, the law provides that federal district courts “may” decline to exercise jurisdiction over certain class actions, and “shall” decline to exercise jurisdiction over others, based on
such matters as the percentage of the plaintiff class that consists of citizens of the state where
the action was originally filed, the significance of an in-state defendant’s role in the case and
of the relief sought against that defendant, and the location of the “principal injuries” alleged
to have been caused by each defendant. See Pub. L. 109–2, § 4(a), 119 Stat. 10. In the face of
such complicated provisions, it is easy to imagine erroneous removals flourishing. At the very
least, it seems certain that these new numerical requirements will spur new, potentially timeconsuming litigation over whether they are satisfied in any given case. See Alan B. Morrison,
Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way to Handle the Problem of Overlapping
Class Actions, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1521, 1543 (2005) (“One concern with using any numerical test
is that it creates the potential for satellite litigation over whether the tests have been met.”). To
the extent a defendant removes a case in part just to delay the case and increase the plaintiffs’
litigation bill, the prospect of such litigation provides an added incentive to engage in erroneous removal.
There is also another way the new law may increase the incentive for erroneous removal. Previously, remand orders in most cases were unappealable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). But see
Michael E. Solimine, Removal, Remands, and Reforming Federal Appellate Review, 58 Mo. L.
Rev. 287 (1993) (contending that, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in
Thermtron Prods., Inc., v. Hermansdorfer, federal appellate courts have gradually eviscerated
§1447(d)’s bar on appellate review of remands). The Class Action Fairness Act changes that for
class-action cases removed pursuant to its provisions. See Pub. L. No. 109–2, § 5(a), 119 Stat.
12 (providing that “a court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a district court
granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the State court from which it was
removed if application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of the
order”). Courts of appeals are directed to resolve such appeals within 60 days, though they are
also authorized to extend that period. Id. By making remand orders appealable, the Class
Action Fairness Act provides defendants with another way to obtain tactical advantage by imposing delays on their opponents.

15

See Morrison, supra note 14, at 1542 (noting “the lack of evidence generally on th[e] topic”
of “illegitimate removals”). There is some evidence in the existing literature, but not much. See
Clermont & Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, supra note 2, at 121–23 (presenting evidence
showing that the percentage of federal diversity cases originating as removals has increased substantially over the past two decades, and that the remand rate of such removals has also
increased substantially over that same period).
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erroneous removal,16 systematic empirical analysis is lacking. This study seeks
to fill the void. We rely principally on data gathered by the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, assembled by the Federal Judicial Center, and disseminated by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research (the AO data).17 These data include information about every case
terminated in federal district court from 1979 through September 30, 2003.
The AO data allow us to track the total number of state cases removed to
federal court each year, the proportion of the federal district courts’ docket
that consists of removal cases, and the rate at which removed cases are
remanded to state court. The data also identify cases by source of federal
jurisdiction (e.g., diversity, federal question, and federal defendant) and
area of law (e.g., contract, tort), allowing us to trace removal and remand
patterns within those categories.
Our results reveal certain trends in removal and remand. The trends
are particularly salient in federal diversity cases.18 First, the annual number
of cases removed to federal court on the basis of diversity generally increased
between 1979 and 2002. In addition, the proportion of the federal diversity
docket that originated in federal court by way of removal rose steadily from
1979 to 2003. Finally, the percentage of removals ultimately remanded to
state court increased significantly over this same time period. That is, just as
more cases purporting to satisfy diversity jurisdiction were being removed to
federal court, and just as removals were occupying an ever-larger part of the
federal docket, more removed cases were being remanded to state court. In
short, erroneous removal is a growing phenomenon.
The balance of this article proceeds in four parts. We begin Section II
by briefly summarizing the purposes and procedures of removal. In so doing,
we identify the features of removal practice that create opportunities for

16

See text accompanying note 13.

17

See Inter-University Consortium for Political & Social Research, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 2003, ICPSR Study No. 4026 (2004); Inter-University Consortium for Political & Social Research, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 2002, ICPSR Study No. 4059
(2004); Inter-University Consortium for Political & Social Research, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 2001, ICPSR Study No. 3415 (2002); Inter-University Consortium for Political & Social Research, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 1970–2000, ICPSR Study No.
8429 (2001). For a discussion of the reliability of this database, see Theodore Eisenberg &
Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An
Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1455 (2003).

18

See text accompanying notes 23–26 for a brief discussion of diversity jurisdiction.
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abuse. To put those theoretical opportunities in a more concrete context,
we offer anecdotal evidence of clearly erroneous removal.
In Section III, we present our findings, drawn from the AO data,
regarding national trends in removal and remand between 1979 and 2003.
As suggested above, our findings suggest that erroneous removal is a growing
phenomenon, and hence an increasingly burdensome deadweight loss for
the federal judicial system.
In Section IV, we look more closely at removal and remand in one individual state, Alabama. The trends at the national level are repeated in
Alabama, but in more extreme form. Moreover, our examination of the
docket sheets for one year’s worth of removal-origin diversity cases in two
federal districts in Alabama enables us to track information not included in
the AO data, including whether a particular removal was ever challenged by
way of a remand motion. That information, in turn, allows us to compare
plaintiffs’ success with remands to defendants’ success with removals. Section
V provides some concluding thoughts.

II. The Process of Removal and Opportunities
for Abuse
Grappling with the problem of erroneous removal requires attention to the
rules governing removal. We therefore begin this section with an overview
of those rules. We then discuss ways the removal process creates opportunities for abuse. To confirm that those opportunities are not merely hypothetical, we also identify a few actual examples of abusive removal.
A. The Removal Process
Ever since the Judiciary Act of 1789,19 Congress has authorized defendants
to remove certain state cases to federal court. From 1789 to 1887, the
requirements for removal were independent of the requirements for initiating a case in federal court as an original matter.20 In the Judiciary Act of

19

20

See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73.

Id., § 12, 1 Stat. at 79–80 (permitting removal only in cases where the amount in controversy
exceeded $500, and even then only if the removing party was (1) a defendant who was an alien;
(2) a defendant who was a citizen of another state, being sued by a citizen of the forum state;
or (3) either a plaintiff or defendant, where the cases involved conflicting claims of title to land
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1887,21 however, Congress tied the elements of removal jurisdiction to the
elements of original jurisdiction. The current general removal provision, 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a), continues that approach.22 Thus, state cases that could
have been initiated in federal court may (assuming adherence to certain
procedural rules described below) be removed from state to federal court.
In theory, permitting removal whenever the case could have been filed
in federal court helps effectuate the aims of the federal jurisdictional grant
itself. Consider diversity jurisdiction. In general, this head of jurisdiction
permits cases to be brought in federal court where the matter in controversy
exceeds a prescribed jurisdictional minimum23 and the case is between citizens of different states, citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state, or a foreign state as plaintiff and citizens of a domestic state or states.24
For present purposes, the most significant aspect of diversity jurisdiction
covers cases between citizens of different states. Although the historical
record contains very little direct evidence on this point,25 the prevailing

pursuant to conflicting grants of land by different states, and where the nonremoving party
claimed title pursuant to a grant by the forum state). In addition, a number of specific removal
statutes enacted during this period authorized removal of certain relatively narrow classes of
cases, such as state suits and prosecutions against federal officers. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 4, 1815,
ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198–99; Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, § 6, 3 Stat. 231, 233–34, extended
for one year by Act of Apr. 27, 1816, ch. 110, § 3, 3 Stat. 315, 315. For further discussion of
federal officer removal, see Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity?
Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 Yale L.J. 2195 (2003).
21

Act of Mar. 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, corrected by Act of Aug. 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433.

22

“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed
by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

23

The Judiciary Act of 1789 set the jurisdictional threshold at $500. See Judiciary Act of 1789,
§ 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. Congress has increased the threshold five times since then, and today it
stands at $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also Act of May 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (increasing the threshold from $500 to $2,000); Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61–475, 36 Stat. 1087,
1091 ($3,000); Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85–554, 72 Stat. 415 ($10,000); Pub. L. No.
100–702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) ($50,000).

24

25

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(4).

See 13B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3601, at 337 (2d ed. 1984) (“Neither the debates of the Constitutional Convention
nor the records of the First Congress shed any substantial light on why diversity jurisdiction was
granted to the federal courts by the Constitution or why the First Congress exercised its option
to vest that jurisdiction in the federal courts.”).
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account since at least the mid-19th century has been that diversity jurisdiction reflects a concern that state courts might unduly favor their own state
residents over out-of-state parties.26 Yet if that is the concern, then merely
vesting the federal courts with diversity jurisdiction is likely insufficient, for
in-state plaintiffs suing out-of-state defendants will simply decline to invoke
federal diversity jurisdiction in favor of proceeding in state court.27 Removal
responds to that problem by allowing defendants sued in state court to
remove the case to federal court to the extent it could have been filed in
federal court in the first place.
Removal litigation is not, however, simply a matter of determining
whether the case falls within a grant of original federal jurisdiction. In addition to that substantive threshold, Congress has prescribed certain procedural rules.28 Most significantly, defendants generally must file a notice of
removal in federal court no more than 30 days after receiving a copy of the
plaintiff’s state court complaint.29 If the case as originally filed is not removable, the 30-day clock does not begin to run until the defendant receives a
copy of an amended complaint or other pleading “from which it may first
be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable,”

26

See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111–12 (1945) (“Diversity jurisdiction is founded
on assurance to non-resident litigants of courts free from susceptibility to potential local bias.”);
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938) (“Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the state.”); Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 599 (1856) (“The theory upon which
jurisdiction is conferred on the courts of the United States, in controversies between citizens
of different states, has its foundation in the supposition that, possibly the state tribunal might
not be impartial between their own citizens and foreigners.”). Whether such state court bias
actually exists has long been a matter of considerable dispute. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The
Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 483, 493 (1928) (arguing that “such
information as we are able to gather . . . entirely fails to show the existence of prejudice on the
part of the state judges”).

27

As a general matter, of course, there is nothing improper about a plaintiff making such a
choice. The federal and state courts generally have concurrent jurisdiction of cases meeting
federal diversity requirements, and it is perfectly permissible for a plaintiff to select the state
forum.

28

We note, moreover, that determining compliance with even the substantive requirements may
be no simple matter, at least in certain classes of cases. See note 14 (discussing the Class Action
Fairness Act’s expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction over certain class-action suits, and
noting that the new jurisdiction depends in part on satisfaction of a number of rather complicated requirements).

29

See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
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except that a case may not be removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction
more than one year after the action was first commenced.30 Difficult questions can arise under these provisions, especially concerning when the 30day clock should run. For example, in states that do not require (or even
permit) plaintiffs to demand a specific sum in their complaints, at what point
does it become sufficiently clear that the amount in controversy satisfies the
jurisdictional minimum under the diversity statute? Courts have not arrived
at a uniform answer.31 Thus, as an initial matter we should perhaps be unsurprised to see a certain amount of erroneous removal. Desiring to remove a
case to the extent possible, but unable to determine for certain whether the
30-day window is still open, defendants may in all good faith decide to err
on the side of removal.
B. Defendants’ Unilateral Control of Removal
Critically, defendants can decide to err on the side of removal because they
wield exclusive authority over the removal decision. Neither the plaintiff nor
the state court where the case was originally filed plays any role in determining whether the case is suitable for removal. Instead, the defendant
simply files a notice of removal in the federal district court covering the territory where the state case is pending.32 Removal is automatic on filing of
the notice. If the propriety of the removal is litigated at all, it happens ex
post in federal court, either on the plaintiff’s motion to remand33 or on the
district court’s own initiative.

30

Id. The Class Action Fairness Act, discussed in the text accompanying notes 10–14, provides
that class actions removed pursuant to the Act are not subject to the one-year limitation. See
Pub. L. 109–2, § 5(a), 119 Stat. 12.

31

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1544–45 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing this and related
questions, and citing cases adopting different approaches); 14C Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra
note 25, § 3725.

32

33

See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).

See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Remand motions are also subject to certain timing constraints.
Although a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be sought and granted at any
time, a motion to remand on other grounds (e.g., the defendant’s failure to remove within the
prescribed 30 days) must itself be made within 30 days of the filing of the notice of removal.
Id.
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This lack of an ex-ante constraint on removal would seem to invite erroneous, and perhaps even knowingly erroneous, removal. Whether the error
reflects an honest miscalculation of such things as the 30-day removal
window or a knowing effort to seek the litigation advantages that come with
delaying the state court proceedings, the only front-end protection against
erroneous removal is the defendant’s own judgment. To be sure, there are
devices in place to discourage obvious abuse: defense counsel must sign the
notice of removal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,34 and an order remanding a case may, in the district court’s discretion,
require the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs incurred
as a result of the removal.35 But such sanctions are not always applied in a
consistent fashion. This is especially true of attorney fees, though, as noted
below,36 a case currently pending before the Supreme Court may provide an
opportunity to clarify the applicable standard.37 At present, however, the
structure of removal makes the process vulnerable to error.
C. Examples of Removal Abuse
Anecdotal evidence of erroneous removal is readily available. Such evidence
suggests that abusive removal—that is, knowingly wrongful removal—may
well be a problem. If we were to develop a typology of removal abuse on the
basis of this evidence, we might begin with multiple wrongful removal. In Smith
v. Life Insurance Co. of Georgia,38 for example, the defendant removed the case
to federal court four times over the course of two years. Each time, the district court returned the case to state court. The district court expressed
evident frustration with the defendant’s actions, especially considering that
the fourth removal happened after trial had already begun in state court.39
Even though the fourth removal was improper, it had the effect of derailing

34

28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).

35

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

36

See note 61.

37

See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., petition for cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1941 (Apr. 25, 2005)
(No. 04–1140).

38

No. 4:04CV97 (N.D. Miss.).

39

See Memorandum Opinion, No. 4:04CV97 (N.D. Miss., May 28, 2004).
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the state trial, ultimately obliging the state court to release the original jury
venire and requiring plaintiffs to start again with a later trial date.
We might also include in our typology of wrongful removal the phenomenon of nonparty removal. In Aluminum Co. of America v. Admiral Insurance Co.,40 for example, an entity not a party to the case filed a notice of
removal. The entity, an insurance company, presumably saw some advantage
in removing a state case against a similarly situated insurance company. Yet
removal by a nondefendant is—and was at the time—clearly improper.41
Accordingly, the district court remanded the case. Moreover, any doubt
about whether this tactic was the product of an honest mistake seems dispelled by Ieyoub v. American Tobacco Co.,42 where the very same insurance
company again removed the case despite the fact that it was again not named
as a defendant. It is hard to understand erroneous removals like these as
anything other than knowing abuses of the litigation process in order to
secure procedural advantage.
Of course, isolated anecdotes of removal abuse do not provide a reliable nationwide picture. Too often, the tort reform debate is driven by a few
stories of outlandish litigation abuse, as though that is enough to justify
reform. It isn’t. Thus, we turn in the next section to a discussion of the empirical data on removal and remand.

III. National Trends: The Growth of Erroneous
Removal
In this section we discuss findings based principally on the AO data. With
respect to diversity cases in particular, we find a number of trends: the annual
number of diversity-based removals has generally increased over the last two
decades; the proportion of the federal diversity docket consisting of cases
originating as removals has also increased; and the rate at which removed
diversity cases are remanded has risen as well. Taken together, these trends
suggest that erroneous removal is a growing phenomenon, and thus exacts
a growing toll on the federal judiciary.

40

No. C93–32C (W.D. Wash.).

41

See, e.g., Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 578–79 (1954).

42

No. 97–1174 (W.D. La.).
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To apprehend nationwide patterns of removal and remand, we must
look at several different trends. First, we need a background understanding
of litigation rates in the state courts. The vast majority of civil lawsuits in this
country are initiated in state, not federal, court.43 Over the past decade,
however, certain kinds of state court litigation have decreased. The National
Center for State Courts has found that, across 35 states representing about
77 percent of the national population, tort filings decreased by 4 percent
between 1993 and 2002.44 In short, tort filings—which are the focus of tort
reform efforts, and as we shall show, are central to the story of erroneous
removal—are down in the state courts.
Second, and bearing in mind the overall decrease in state tort filings,
we turn to changes in the annual number of removals from state to federal
court. The AO data reveal that, over roughly the same period, diversity-based
tort removals did not decline. In 1993, 8,128 removed diversity tort cases
terminated in federal court. By 2002, the last full year for which numbers
are publicly available, the number had increased to 8,926, an increase of
about 10 percent.45 In short, a shrinking pool of state tort cases did not yield
a similarly shrinking number of tort removals. Instead, defendants removed
about the same number of diversity tort cases despite a shrinking pool from
which to draw.
Moreover, if we look at all diversity removals over the same period
(expanding the search beyond just tort cases), we again see an increase in
the number of removals per year. In 1993, 14,637 removed diversity cases
terminated in federal court; in 2002, that number rose to 17,622. Longerterm trends are consistent. As Figure 1 shows, from 1979 to 2002 the total
annual number of diversity cases originating as removals generally increased.
The same is not true, however, of diversity cases initiated in federal court
over the same time period. Indeed, whereas the volume of diversity litigation originating in federal court fluctuated considerably between 1979 and
2002 (returning in 2002 roughly to 1979 levels), diversity removals rose fairly
steadily over the same period.

43

See Daniel John Meador, American Courts 31–33 (2d ed. 2000).

44

See National Center for State Courts, Examining the Work of State Courts, 2003: A National
Perspective from the Court Statistics Project 23 (2004).

45

In 1997 and 1998, diversity tort removals exceeded 9,400. In 1999, 2000, and 2001, they ranged
between 8,000 and 8,100.
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Figure 1: Federal diversity casees first filed in federal court versus federal
diversity cases originating as removals.
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Year of Termination
Origin=removal diversity

Origin=nonremoval

Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1979–2002.

Third, we consider removals in relation to the federal courts’ overall
caseload. Here again, diversity removals in particular display an upward
trend. As Figure 2 demonstrates, between 1979 and 2003 there was a
significant increase in the proportion of federal diversity cases originating
as removals. Removed cases accounted for less than 20 percent of the
diversity docket in 1979; by 2003, the figure well exceeded 30 percent. The
same trend is visible when, as in Figure 3, we divide diversity cases by
substantive case category: diversity-based tort removals account for an
increasing proportion of the diversity tort docket; diversity-based contract
removals account for a similarly increasing proportion of the diversity
contract docket.
Fourth, and most importantly, we consider changes in the rate at which
removed cases were remanded to state court. Once again, the data reveal a
clear trend in diversity cases. As Figure 4 shows, removed diversity cases’
increased presence on the federal docket was accompanied by a substantial
increase in the remand rate for those same cases. Indeed, the remand rate
for diversity removals rose from about 12 percent in 1979 to almost
20 percent in 2003. As Figure 5 demonstrates, the same general pattern
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Figure 2: Proportion of federal cases originating as removals by source of
federal jurisdiction.
Federal question
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Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1979–2003.
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Figure 3: Proportion of diversity cases originating as removals, tort and
contract.
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Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1979–2003.
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Figure 4: Remand rate of cases removed to federal court by source of federal
jurisdiction.
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is visible when we divide diversity removals into tort and contract cases.
Despite a slight decrease in the remand rates for both categories over the
last couple of years, over the longer term the remand rates have increased
fairly steadily.
It is also worth noting the remand rate for cases falling under the other
two main heads of federal jurisdiction—federal question and federal defendant. As Figure 4 shows, the remand rate for federal question cases increased
dramatically in 2002 and 2003, reaching as high as 60 percent. That recent
increase, however, is attributable to the remands of more than 20,000
asbestos cases46 and does not appear to reflect a lasting trend among federal
question cases or across other categories of cases. Excluding that increase,
46

According to AO termination data, in calendar year 2002 and nine months of calendar year
2003, 21,917 purported federal question asbestos cases were remanded to state courts; 10,484
of those remands (47.8 percent) were from the Northern District of Ohio. Another 3,727 (17.0
percent) were remands from the Eastern District of Virginia. Those same asbestos remands
explain the recent sharp increase, shown in Figure 2, in the proportion of all federal question
cases originating as removals. That proportion is based on the total number of removed and
nonremoved cases terminated each year, whether by remand or otherwise. Thus, the remand
of an unusually large number of cases in a particular year will cause an increase in the number
of removed cases reported in Figure 2.
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we note that by 2001, the remand rate for federal question cases was about
20 percent. The same was true for federal defendant cases.47 Taken together
with the increase in the remand rate for diversity cases, this means that, by
2001, almost a fifth of all removed cases were remanded.48 That would seem
to constitute a substantial drag on the federal system.

47

As Figure 4 shows, the remand rate for federal defendant cases has remained reasonably
steady over time, with the exception of a fairly substantial decrease in the late 1980s and early
1990s. That drop may be attributable to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mesa v. California, 489
U.S. 121 (1989), which restricted the availability of removal in cases against federal officers. We
have not attempted to measure Mesa’s effect in any direct way, but it is conceivable that Mesa
caused fewer federal officers even to try to remove their cases, which in turn depressed the
overall remand rate. This story is consistent with the fact, reflected in Figure 2, that the proportion of federal defendant cases originating as removals began to decrease fairly steadily in
about 1990.

48

Federal defendant, federal question, and diversity removals collectively account for very nearly
all removals. In 1999, for example, 30,959 of the 31,018 removed cases that terminated in
federal court, or 99.8 percent of the total, fell into one of those three categories. That percentage held in 2000, when 29,776 of 29,826 terminated removals fell into one of the three categories. (The few cases left over in both years were federal plaintiff removals.) Thus, to speak
of the overall remand rate for federal defendant, federal question, and diversity cases is, for all
intents and purposes, to speak of the remand rate for all removals.
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In sum, the AO data reveal that, by the early 2000s, a substantial percentage of removals were erroneous. Over the last two decades, the problem
has generally grown for diversity-based removals, and the rate of growth
(considered in terms of total number of remands per year) has generally
increased as well.
Of course, the AO data themselves do not show precisely why erroneous
diversity removals have increased over the last two decades. We note, though,
that the time trend corresponds roughly with the rise of mass tort litigation
and, in particular, with the increase (real or perceived) in punitive damage
awards in state tort litigation.49 Without regard to the actual extent of the
increase in state mass tort judgments, defendants’ (and defense counsels’)
perception of a dramatic increase, combined with the widespread belief that
exposure tended to be greater in state than federal court, provided an incentive to remove as many cases as possible. In short, and unsurprisingly, the
increase in erroneous removal over the last two decades corresponds with a
period during which defendants saw more to be gained from removal.

IV. Alabama: A Closer Look
To better understand the phenomenon of erroneous removal, we examine
in greater detail the patterns of removal and remand in a single state,
Alabama. Our selection is not random. Over the past decade, the Alabama
state courts have often been identified as hotbeds of anti-defendant bias and
abusive plaintiff-side litigation tactics.50 As a result, one might expect defen-

49

See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages,
72 Va. L. Rev. 139, 142 (1986) (“In the mid-1970’s, unprecedented numbers of punitive awards
in products liability and other mass tort situations began to surface. Many of these awards were
also unprecedented in amount. And these trends continued and accelerated into the 1980’s.”);
George L. Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 123, 123 (1982)
(noting that a study of civil trials in Cook County, Illinois, showed that punitive damages were
awarded in four times as many cases in 1979 as in an average year between 1959 and 1978).
But see Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Michael Heise, Neil LaFountain, G.
Thomas Munsterman, Brian Ostrom & Martin T. Wells, Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages:
Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, J.
Empirical Legal Stud. (forthcoming in 2006) (no real increase in punitive damages awards from
1992 to 2001 in approximately 45 large urban counties).

50

See, e.g., 2005 U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems Ranking Study (2005)
(reporting that, in a national Harris Poll of in-house general counsel and other senior litigators at public corporations regarding their views on the fairness of each state’s “liability system,”
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dants sued in Alabama state court to be particularly eager to seek removal,
perhaps even to the point of attempting to remove cases not eligible for
removal.
We rely on two data sources to assess the presence of erroneous
removal in Alabama. First, we use the AO data, focusing here on the three
federal districts in Alabama. These data show that erroneous removal is an
even greater problem in Alabama than it is nationally. As Figure 6 depicts,
the annual volume of diversity removals to Alabama’s three federal districts
increased from 1979 to 2002, just as it did nationwide. As Figure 7 shows, all
three federal districts in Alabama also experienced significant increases in
the remand rate for diversity cases, increases substantially exceeding the
national increase. Indeed, for a time in the late 1990s, over 60 percent of
diversity cases removed to the Middle and Southern Districts of Alabama
were remanded. In short, the trends in Alabama from the late 1970s to the
early 2000s are generally more extreme versions of the national trends for
the same period: the number of diversity removals increased more rapidly,
and the remand rate was both higher as an absolute matter and more precipitous in its rise.
Figures 6 and 7 also show, however, that erroneous removal has
decreased in all three Alabama federal districts since the late 1990s, though
it remains above where it was in the 1980s and early 1990s. The decrease
over the last few years corresponds to what appears to be a shift in the defendants’-side literature toward singling out other jurisdictions as the “worst
of the worst” in terms of their purported pro-plaintiff bias. That is, while

Alabama ranked 48th out of the 50 states); American Tort Reform Association, Bringing Justice
to Judicial Hellholes (2002) (singling out several counties in Alabama for “dishonorable
mention” as “judicial hellholes”); Rand Institute for Civil Justice, Punitive Damage Awards in
Financial Injury Jury Verdicts (1997) (reporting the results of a study of punitive damages
awarded between 1985 and 1994 in California, New York, Cook County, Illinois, St. Louis, Missouri, and Harris County, Texas, and between 1992 and 1997 in Alabama, and stating that “in
Alabama, punitive damages are awarded more often and are higher in any given case relative
to compensatory damages than in the other jurisdictions in the database”); Gregory Janes,
Where the Torts Blossom, Time, Mar. 20, 1995, at 38, 38 (noting that Alabama’s “Barbour
County . . . has become nationally recognized as tort hell”). But see Erik K. Moller, Nicholas M.
Pace & Stephen J. Carroll, Punitive Damages in Financial Injury Jury Verdicts, 28 J. Legal Stud.
283, 333–34 (1999) (Alabama juries award punitive damages in financial injury cases at rates
similar to other states, award smaller punitive damages than in other states, but punitive awards
constitute a high proportion of amounts awarded and are a high multiple of compensatory
damages).
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Figure 6: Number of diversity removals, Alabama federal districts.
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Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1979–2002.

Alabama continues to be viewed negatively by defense counsel,51 some
studies no longer rank Alabama among the very worst purported “judicial
hellholes” in the country.52 Our data provide no way to confirm this, but if
defense counsel no longer view Alabama state courts as negatively as they
did several years ago, it is possible that their felt need to remove Alabama
cases to federal court might be less than it was previously. If so, that might
explain the recent decrease in erroneous removal in Alabama. Even with
that decrease, however, Figure 7 confirms that a substantial percentage of
all removals in Alabama continue to happen in error.
In addition to drawing on the AO database, we have used the AO’s
Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) service to access electronic docket sheets for every case removed to the U.S. District Courts for

51

52

See 2005 U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems Ranking Study, supra note 49.

Compare American Tort Reform Association, Bringing Justice to Judicial Hellholes (2002)
(singling out several counties in Alabama for “dishonorable mention” as “judicial hellholes”),
with American Tort Reform Association, Judicial Hellholes (2004), and American Tort Reform
Association, Bringing Justice to Judicial Hellholes (2003) (omitting reference to any Alabama
jurisdiction).
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Figure 7: Remand rates of removed diversity cases, Alabama districts versus
all other federal districts.
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the Northern and Middle Districts of Alabama that terminated in 2001.
Inevitably, there is a limit to how much we can infer from a single year’s data
in two districts. But even within the limited timeframe, the docket sheets
allow us to track important information not included in the AO data. Most
significantly, the docket sheets reveal whether removal was challenged in a
particular case. We can therefore measure plaintiffs’ success rates in seeking
remand, and can compare that to defendants’ success rates in keeping their
removed cases in federal court.
Tables 1 and 2 display our findings. Two results stand out. First, many
removals are not challenged. As shown in Panel A of Tables 1 and 2, about
48 percent of all diversity removals and 60 percent of all federal question
removals were not contested. Second, in cases where removal was actively
challenged, the remand rate is very high. That rate is displayed most directly
in Panel B of Tables 1 and 2. As the tables suggest, the docket sheets show
two forms of remand. The most common method is for the plaintiff to file
a remand motion. Alternatively, the district court may examine the propriety of removal on its own initiative. In the latter case, the docket sheets will
sometimes record the court as having remanded the case even though no
remand motion was filed. We call these “sua sponte remands.” Tables 1 and
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Table 1: Disposition of Diversity Tort and Contract Cases Removed to the
U.S. District Courts for the Northern and Middle Districts of Alabama, Cases
Terminating in 2001
A. Cases With & Without Motions to Remand
Include Sua Sponte Remands

Tort (N )
Percent
Contract (N )
Percent
Total (N )
Percent

Exclude Sua Sponte Remands

Remand
Denied

Remanded

No Motion

Remand
Denied

Remanded

No Motion

18
8.4
19
8.0
37
8.2

80
37.4
116
49.0
196
43.5

116
54.2
102
43.0
218
48.3

18
9.0
19
8.4
37
8.7

66
33.0
104
46.2
170
40.0

116
58.0
102
45.3
218
51.3

B. Cases with Motions to Remand
Include Sua Sponte Remands
Tort (N )
Percent
Contract (N )
Percent
Total (N )
Percent

18
18.4
19
14.1
37
15.9

80
81.6
116
85.9
196
84.1

—
—
—
—
—
—

Exclude Sua Sponte Remands
18
21.4
19
15.5
37
17.9

66
78.6
104
84.6
170
82.1

—
—
—
—
—
—

Note: Sua sponte remands are removed cases that were remanded to state court but in which
the docket sheet contains no evidence that a motion to remand was made.
Source: Individual case docket sheets, accessed through the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) project.

2 display the remand success rate both including and excluding sua sponte
remands.53 Either way, the remand success rate is very high. Table 1, Panel
B, shows that, excluding sua sponte remands, plaintiffs succeeded in 82.1
percent of the diversity cases whose removals they challenged. Including sua
53

It may make sense to include sua sponte remands when calculating plaintiffs’ success rate in
obtaining remands. First, some remands recorded as sua sponte may actually be plaintiff initiated. Oral remand motions might not always be recorded; instead, the docket sheet may simply
record the court’s formal order of remand. Second, in cases where the propriety of the removal
is first raised by the court sua sponte, the plaintiff may well have raised the issue had the court
not done so first. Third, even in cases where the plaintiff was unaware of an argument for
remand until the court raised it, the remand itself amounts to a success for the plaintiff insofar
as it returns the case to the plaintiff’s chosen forum. For all these reasons, including sua sponte
remands may yield the most accurate assessment of plaintiffs’ true success rates in this area.
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Table 2: Disposition of Diversity and Federal Question Cases Removed to
the U.S. District Court for the Northern and Middle Districts of Alabama,
Cases Terminating in 2001
A. Cases With & Without Motions to Remand
Include Sua Sponte Remands

Diversity (N )
Percent
Federal question (N )
Percent
Total (N )
Percent

Exclude Sua Sponte Remands

Remand
Denied

Remanded

No Motion

Remand
Denied

Remanded

No Motion

37
8.2
25
12.6
62
9.6

196
43.5
54
27.3
250
38.5

218
48.3
119
60.1
337
51.9

37
8.7
25
13.5
62
10.2

170
40.0
41
22.2
211
34.6

218
51.3
119
64.3
337
55.3

B. Cases with Motions to Remand
Include Sua Sponte Remands
Diversity (N )
Percent
Federal question (N )
Percent
Total (N )
Percent

37
15.9
25
32.5
62
20.0

196
84.1
52
67.5
248
80.0

—
—
—
—
—
—

Exclude Sua Sponte Remands
37
17.9
25
39.1
62
30.6

170
82.1
39
60.9
209
69.4

—
—
—
—
—
—

Note: Sua sponte remands are removed cases that were remanded to state court but in which
the docket sheet contains no evidence that a motion to remand was made.
Source: Individual case docket sheets, accessed through the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) project.

sponte remands, Table 1 shows that plaintiffs’ success rate for diversity cases
was 84.1 percent. The remand success rate is similarly high for the subset of
cases consisting of diversity tort cases reported in Panel B’s “Tort” rows—
78.6 percent excluding sua sponte remands, 81.6 percent including them.
Another way of expressing these results is that plaintiffs’ error rate in
seeking remand is substantially lower (17.9 percent for diversity cases excluding sua sponte remands; 15.9 percent when including them, as shown in
Table 2, Panel B’s “Diversity” rows) than defendants’ error rate when removing in the first place (43.5 percent for diversity-based removals, as shown in
Table 2, Panel A’s “Diversity” rows). The disparity is similarly high for the
diversity-based tort removal subset of cases. Whereas plaintiffs’ remand error
rate is 21.4 percent for such cases (18.4 percent if sua sponte remands are
included, as shown in Table 1, Panel B’s “Tort” rows), defendants’ removal
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error rate is much higher at 37.4 percent (as shown in Table 1, Panel A’s
“Tort” rows).54
This disparity in error rates may provide a basis for assessing whether
the prevalence of erroneous removal is the product of honest uncertainty
about the law or abusive litigation practices. Consider the case for the proposition that uncertainty about the law explains removal error. This account
stresses that the procedural requirements governing the removal process can
raise difficult questions, particularly with respect to the running of the 30day removal clock. As suggested in Section II, to the extent the law is too
complicated to yield accurate predictions about its application, defense
counsel may decide that zealous advocacy requires erring on the side of
removal. If so, then much erroneous removal could be attributed to factual
and doctrinal uncertainty. Yet if this were the case, we might also expect
plaintiffs’ remand efforts to yield an error rate comparable to the rate of
erroneous removal. That is, if uncertainty leads each side to err on the side
of overprotecting its interests, then Alabama plaintiffs should file a high rate
of unsuccessful remand motions just as Alabama defendants engage in a
high rate of erroneous removal. But the data do not reveal such parity.
Instead, plaintiffs challenge fewer than half of all removals,55 but prevail in
over 80 percent of their challenges. This suggests that plaintiffs are quite
adept at distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate removals. Unless
we hypothesize an Alabama plaintiffs’ bar that is far more legally sophisticated than its defense-side counterpart, it may be fair to surmise that defense
counsel can also distinguish between proper and improper removals, but
pursue improper removals anyway. That is, the high rate of erroneous
removal in Alabama may be best attributed to knowingly wrongful removal,
not simply to honest uncertainty about the law.56

54

The pattern of high remand rates in contested removals spans both districts. For example,
the 80 percent remand rate in the left columns of Table 2, Panel B, is the combination of an
83 percent remand rate in the Middle District of Alabama and a 77 percent remand rate in the
Northern District of Alabama. But the sua sponte remand activity is much higher in the Northern District than in the Middle District.

55

56

See Table 1, Panel A; Table 2, Panel A.

Of course, the erroneous defense removal rate discussed here is measured with reference only
to removed cases. Another potentially relevant measure of defendant error would be to consider cases at the state court level, prior to removal. At that stage, many cases are not removed,
either because defendants believe no ground for removal exists or because defendants are
content with the state forum. Data limitations and the difficulty of independently analyzing a
properly removable case limit the ability to compute an ex-ante rate of erroneous removal.
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There may, however, be other ways to account for the difference
between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ error rates. In particular, it may be that
the 30-day removal period is sometimes too short for defendants to ascertain whether a case is removable. For example, as mentioned in Section II,
difficult questions can arise regarding the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, especially where the complaint does not
expressly quantify the claim for relief. Thirty days may not be enough to
resolve such questions. Similarly, the complaint may omit any allegation of
the plaintiff’s citizenship, and reliably answering that question may also take
more than 30 days. In such circumstances, the defendant might elect to
remove the case without yet knowing for certain whether the case is removable, on the theory that the open questions will be resolved later and the
case remanded if appropriate.57 By the time the plaintiff decides whether to
seek a remand, however, this uncertainty might not be an issue—either
because the plaintiff knew the relevant information all along, or because the
additional time has enabled the plaintiff to ascertain facts that the defendant was unable to learn within the initial 30 days. In other words, the information defendants rely on to make removal decisions may be more
imperfect than the information later available to plaintiffs when deciding
whether to seek remand. If so, then it would not be surprising to find that
plaintiffs are more successful with their remands than defendants are with
their removals.58
In sum, the docket sheet data are consistent with attributing at least
some of the rise in erroneous removal in Alabama to knowingly wrongful,
abusive removal. But there are other possible explanations as well, and the
data do not afford a basis for determining which explanation is best. The
AO data do, however, clearly establish that erroneous removal is a growing

57

This appears to be the recommended practice in California. See California Practice Guide:
Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial 2:927.1 (“If defense counsel receives a state court complaint within 30 days after service and the defendant is a nonresident, serious consideration
should be given to immediate removal . . . regardless of any uncertainty as to plaintiff’s
domicile.”).

58

Remand motions are also subject to a 30-day period, though in practice it is probably less
onerous. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), “[a] motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect
other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of
the notice of removal.” The exception for lack of subject matter jurisdiction effectively gives
plaintiffs as long as they need (as long as final judgment has not yet been entered) on that
issue. True, they have only 30 days to ascertain whether the removal was proper on other
grounds, including whether the defendant complied with its 30-day limitation period. In most
cases, however, that question is probably quite easy to answer.
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phenomenon, both nationally and in Alabama. The growth is especially pronounced in diversity cases, where, over the last two decades, the total number
of removals has risen, the portion of the federal diversity docket consisting
of removals has expanded, and the remand rate has climbed. If these trends
continue, the federal courts will be obliged to devote more and more of their
scarce resources to state cases that belong in state court.

V. Conclusion
Substantial empirical evidence establishes that, especially among state cases
removed on diversity grounds, erroneous removal is a significant and
growing phenomenon. Erroneous removal increases litigation costs, delays
resolution of the merits, and imposes a deadweight loss on the judiciary. To
be sure, not all instances of erroneous removal are abusive, and some errors
are probably unavoidable. But the increasing incidence of the phenomenon
commends consideration of sensible reforms.
One possible reform might be to create a stronger rule in favor of fee
shifting when a removed case is remanded. The removal statute provides
that the remanding court “may” order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s
attorney fees and costs “incurred as a result of the removal,”59 but the lower
courts appear divided over what standard to use in implementing this provision.60 Congress could amend the statute to make fee shifting mandatory,
or at least to create a presumption in favor of fee shifting upon remand. In
the absence of legislative reform, the courts could consider adopting such a
presumption under the current statute.61 In any event, the data presented
here suggest that erroneous removal is a problem worth addressing.

59

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

60

Compare Hornbuckle v. State Farm Lloyds, 385 F.3d 538, 541 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Fees should
only be awarded if the removing defendant lacked objectively reasonable grounds to believe
the removal was legally proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), with Hart v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2004) (“If removal is found to be improper, the plaintiff is presumptively entitled to an award of fees.”).

61

The Supreme Court will have an opportunity to do so this Term in Martin v. Franklin Capital
Corp., petition for cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1941 (Apr. 25, 2005) (No. 04–1140).

